I am an Assistant Professor in the Department of Economics and Finance at the University of Rome Tor Vergata and Research Associate at CAGE Warwick.
My research interests are Applied Microeconomics, Political Economy and Economic History. Wider fields of interest include Behavioural Economics, and Development.
Prior to joining Tor Vergata, I was a Lecturer in Economics at the University of Bristol. I received my PhD from The University of Warwick in 2016.
Impulse Purchases, Gun Ownership and Homicides: Evidence from a Firearm Demand Shock
– with David Schindler – forthcoming at The Review of Economics and Statistics
[Abstract] [Draft] – Covered on [Salon] [Handelsblatt] [Wirtschaftswoche] [Ökonomenstimme]
Do firearm purchase delay laws reduce aggregate homicide levels? Using quasi-experimental evidence from a 6-month countrywide gun demand shock starting in late 2012, we show that U.S. states with legislation preventing immediate handgun purchases experienced smaller increases in handgun sales. Our findings are hard to reconcile with entirely rational consumers, but suggest that gun buyers behave time-inconsistently. In a second step, we demonstrate that states with purchase delays also witnessed 2% lower homicide rates during the same period compared to states allowing instant handgun access. We report suggestive evidence that lower handgun sales primarily reduced impulsive assaults and domestic violence.
Loose Cannons: War Veterans and the Erosion of Democracy in Weimar Germany
– forthcoming at The Journal of Economic History
Patronage and Election Fraud: Insights from Russia’s Governors 2000–2012
Theory and empirics suggest that patronage fosters election fraud. But why does fraud vary within autocracies where patronage’s incentives to manipulate should be uniformly high? In this paper, I explore whether information asymmetries can explain this phenomenon. I study the introduction of a patronage system which allowed Russia’s president to discretionarily appoint all 89 regional governors. After December 2004, all national elections were organized by governors facing removal but, crucially, only some were actually patronage-appointed with lower need to signal their qualities. I estimate the effect of the reform’s introduction and its staggered implementation on a new and verified regional fraud indicator for 7 national elections from 2000–2012. Results show that patronage increased overall levels of rigging but less so with patronage-appointed, connected governors. Appointments had no effect on actual election results and regional economic performance, which makes reduced uncertainty about governors’ loyalty the most plausible explanation.
The Political Fallout of Chernobyl: Evidence from West-German Elections
Work in progress
The Burden of Memory: Persistence of Ethnic Conflict in Yugoslavia – with Leonard Kukić and Filip Novokmet
Wages, Mortality and Voting in Imperial Germany – with Yanos Zylberberg
Political Alignment and Development Funds: Evidence from post-WWII Southern Italy – with Letizia Borgomeo and Mauro Rota
The Political Effects of the 1918 Influenza Pandemic in Germany – with Stefan Bauernschuster, Matthias Blum and Erik Hornung
The Long-Run Consequences of Transition Unemployment in Eastern Europe – with Andreas Menzel and Ekaterina Travova